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Abstract: Digital commons have held the interest of the research community 
in recent years. However, institutional recognition has not been fully awarded 
mainly due to the absence of a comprehensive reporting framework. The objective 
of our research is to identify indicators in order to measure open source projects 
performance. Motivation that led us to carry out this analysis was the fact that, 
despite the many benefits attributed to open sourcing, no information about it was 
disclosed on annual reports. We are based on previous literature about creating 
institutions to governing the commons. One of the key goals is institutional 
reporting to members of the community, so we believe that a reporting model 
based on social responsibility framework is clearly suitable for this purpose. 
Social responsibility and sustainability are about enabling organizations to 
incorporate creation of social, environmental and economic value into core 
strategy and operations; their reporting is key to create value for organizations, 
their stakeholders and society as a whole. To reach our goal, we asked a panel of 
open source experts their opinion about the key success factors and other relevant 
variables for the purpose of recommending a methodology to calculate specific 
indicators to be disclosed on social responsibility reports.
Keywords: Free software, open source software, peer production, reporting, 
social responsibility, sustainability
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1. Introduction
Practices in production and development that favour access to the end product’s 
source materials are frequently labelled by the term ‘open source’. These 
methodologies are commonly applied to the peer production development of 
software source code that is shared online for public collaboration and reuse as 
open source software (OSS). A concept map of OSS methodology is provided in 
Figure 1. Before ‘open source’ became widely adopted, developers and producers 
used a diversity of terms to convey the same idea, being ‘free software’ the mostly 
used expression. The name ‘open source’ rose in popularity with the global spread 
of the Internet that provided access to diverse production models, communication 
paths, and interactive communities.
OSS may be used, studied, and modified by everyone without restriction, even 
for commercial use or development. Copy and redistribution are also permitted with 
the only restriction being that further recipients will have to hold former rights. To 
secure these rights, not only the binaries but also the source code1 must be made 
available to the recipient along with a legal license granting the above permissions.
OSS could be under a GPL-type license, meaning that derivative works must 
be licensed the same way, or under the more permissive BSD-type license, which 
sets minimal restrictions on how the software can be redistributed even just 
enabling privative redistribution. The broader terms ‘restrictive’ and ‘permissive’ 
licenses are sometimes found in the primary literature on open source licensing to 
refer to GPL-type and BSD-type licenses.
Open source and free software describe almost the same category of 
software, but they are placed on fundamentally different values. According to 
Stallman (2007) open source is a development methodology focused just on 
how to make software better but free software is a social movement drawn by an 
ethical imperative to respect the users’ freedom. The understanding term ‘Free 
Libre Open Source Software’ (FLOSS) is commonly used to describe the joint 
characteristics between free software and open source. It emphasizes the loose 
component of the free software with the Spanish term ‘libre’, avoiding confusion 
with the no-payment meaning of free.
It becomes apparent at first glance that OSS is a shared resource, a long-
enduring knowledge common that would benefit from the interdisciplinary 
approach that is characteristically in the commons research community. The 
1
 Source code is the human-readable form of any collection of computer instructions, particularly 
useful to modify the program or understand how it works. Binary code is the encoded instructions, 
which causes a computer to perform indicated tasks; it is generated through a process called ‘compi-
lation’, which translates human-readable source code into machine-executable binary code.
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current paper analyses social and governance aspects of OSS, focusing on 
sustainability reporting of OSS from a social responsibility approach. To that end, 
it has two main objectives.
The first objective is to discuss and explain the lack of institutional recognition 
OSS is suffering in corporate reporting, specifically with the financial reporting 
framework view of what an asset is. This view heavily relies on traditional private 
property regimes and exclusive rights to the appropriation of benefits. However, 
OSS is a digital common pool resource, whose key problems are not subtraction 
and overconsumption but contributions to its code from the community members. 
Consequently, it doesn’t fit into traditional views of financial reporting as defined 
by accounting standard-setting bodies. Because of this impediment, it becomes 
impossible to report OSS value on financial statements.
Growing institutional recognition should be achieved for OSS through 
corporate reporting. It fosters and determines the behaviour of individual, 
communities and organizations that revolve around creation and reuse of OSS. We 
claim a reporting model based on social responsibility framework may be suitable 
to fulfil corporate reporting about OSS. At the same time, it may strengthen self-
governance mechanisms. We also advocate that contributions to OSS are a higher 
stage of socially responsible activities. They represent the construction of a high-
value shared resource freely available to the whole society, and not just restorative 
activities focused on repairing the harm caused or revealed by the economic 
activity, as it is usual in other industries.
Once the need of a reporting framework has arisen, our second goal is to 
identify the principal stakeholders in an open source project and the main 
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Figure 1: OSS concept map.
Source: own elaboration.
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indicators in order to measure open source projects performance. A Delphi 
process was employed in order to provide the basis to this objective. Results might 
be useful for those open source projects pursuing adequate communication of 
their environment and results, and interested in improving their self-governance 
mechanisms as well. 
2. Open source software and corporate information
The open source model has resulted in a large and efficient ecosystem of software 
innovation, freely available to society. Because open source assets are developed 
collectively, there is no single source for cost estimates of how much it has taken 
to develop the technology. Even large projects with company backing do not 
have these cost estimates due to the collaboration of multiple external developers 
and to the reuse of code in their projects. There is a great value on open source 
developments, but the current legal framework for financial reporting doesn’t 
allow reporting on them like on other assets. Thus, financial statements could be 
insufficient to assess properly the performance and the value generation potential 
(García-García and Alonso de Magdaleno 2013).
Driver (2010) estimated that by 2012 around 80% of software products firms 
would use OSS. Another report by Hammond (2009) presented a conservative 
estimation of 46% of firms included in a global survey that were using or 
developing OSS. Therefore, there are little doubts about the general interest for a 
wide audience of finding indicators and metrics to evaluate OSS projects. Daffara 
(2012) estimates the contribution of open source to Europe’s economy as being 
around 450 billion euros per year, taking into account direct cost savings but also 
other benefits like reduced project failure and lower costs for code maintenance. 
Communities, foundations or public and private companies developing OSS 
acknowledge the community upon they are dependant in their annual reports, 
noting the importance of contributions to develop and encourage the project and 
ensure its adequate evolution. Nevertheless, despite the many gains attributed to 
open sourcing, no meaningful information about it is being disclosed in annual 
reports.
There are also some notable projects that make available tools and metrics 
to understand collaborative production of OSS, aiming at creating models 
for measuring sustainability of OSS projects: Ohloh,2
 FLOSSMetrics3 or 
FLOSSmole4 collect and freely provide data with information and metrics 
about OSS development coming from several thousands of software projects. In 
addition, several techniques have been created to define an evaluation process 
for OSS focusing on features like the maturity, the durability and the strategy 
of the organization around the OSS project itself, but also adding functional 
2
 Ohloh: http://ohloh.net/
3
 FLOSSMetrics project: http://melquiades.flossmetrics.org/
4
 FLOSSmole: http://flossmole.org/
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aspects to the evaluation procedure: Open Source Maturity (OMM) models from 
Capgemini, Navica and QualiPSo, Qualification and Selection of Open Source 
software (QSOS), Open Business Readiness Rating (OpenBRR), Open Business 
Quality Rating (OpenBQR) and Model for Open Source Software Trustworthiness 
(MOSST) from QualiPSo. These sorts of processes, products, resources and 
quality metrics matter and are important to build trust in the development process 
of organizations using or producing OSS, but are not the ultimate answer to assess 
the economic and social value of OSS.
2.1. Legal framework for financial reporting
Although the financial reporting framework is able to deal with cooperative 
production through legally incorporated organizations, it is not ready to cope with 
the more challenging commons-based peer production. Conditions imposed by 
this framework in order to recognize the existence of an asset and its value are 
the key factors to shape the institutional acceptance of OSS and any other digital 
common at reporting level.
Under the standard framework of accounting standards for financial reporting 
used in any given jurisdiction, general volunteer activity is not reflected on 
financial statements. Current accounting framework ignores activities carried out 
by users and outside of formal productive contexts. Consequently, commons-
based peer production value could not be recognized or reflected on financial 
statements; even though this volunteer activity encloses not only individuals but 
also corporations contributing software into the open source movement.
Following Bauwens (2005), commons-based peer production are those 
processes that:
•	 Are geared to produce use value for a community of users through the free 
cooperation of producers who have access to distributed capital.
•	 Are governed by the community of producers themselves, and not by 
market allocation or corporate hierarchy.
•	 Make this use value freely accessible on a universal basis, through new 
common property regimes.
Assets, also known as economic resources, are the fundamental concept in 
accounting and financial reporting. IASB (2001) defines an asset, physical or 
intangible, as a resource controlled by an organization as a result of past events and 
from which future economic benefits are expected to be collected. In addition to 
this, intangible assets are specifically defined as identifiable non-monetary assets 
that cannot be seen, touched or physically measured, which are created through time 
and/or effort and that are identifiable as a separate asset. According to International 
Accounting Standard 38 (IASB 1998) the three critical attributes of an intangible 
asset are separate identifiability, control and future economic benefits.
Particularly, an entity must control an item’s future economic benefit to be 
able to consider the item as its asset. The classical view of control over assets is 
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based on scarcity: To enjoy an asset’s benefits, an entity generally must be in a 
position to deny or regulate access to that benefit by others. The entity having an 
asset is the one that can exchange it, use it to produce goods or services, exact a 
price for others’ use of it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or perhaps distribute it 
to owners (FASB 1985). Outstandingly, peer production generated assets face the 
problem of the control over them. Under open licenses there is one organization 
that keeps some minor legal control over the asset. But it doesn’t hold any real 
control about its uses and economic exploitation; any organization that freely 
receives the asset can use it to generate income.
Despite the main essence of an asset being its future economic benefit, the 
traditional view is built around viewing them as private goods. In consequence, 
superfluous attention is placed on the past transaction or event that gave rise 
to an asset. Nevertheless, the means of procurement should not have an effect 
upon whether the assets fulfil critical attributes. Under IASB (2001) an asset 
is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that the future economic 
benefits will flow to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can be 
measured reliably. In accordance with FASB (1985) anything that is commonly 
used to produce goods or services, whether tangible or intangible and whether or 
not it has a market price or is otherwise exchangeable, also has future economic 
benefit. That is to say any resource with the capacity to give rise to cash inflows or 
a reduction in cash outflows (savings), at the present time, is an asset, rather than 
whether or not it was acquired at a cost. Hence, the problem with OSS valuation 
on the current financial reporting framework is not the absence of a registered 
transaction but the lack of exclusionary rights to an economic benefit.
But even though a registered transaction is not a required attribute, historical 
cost accounting is considered more conservative and reliable in order to enter 
an asset in the accounts. Historical cost accounting records the value of an 
asset as its acquisition value because it is objective and verifiable. Fair value 
accounting, in contrast, records the value as a current amount at which an asset 
could be exchanged between knowledgeable and willing parties in an arms length 
transaction (IASB 2011); fair value is estimated using valuation techniques if 
market prices for identical or similar assets are not available, with recurrent 
measurements to capture changes in values over time. At the present time, there 
are not any valuation techniques suitable to commons based peer production 
assets. However, higher volatility on assets under the fair value approach and 
conservative accounting principles make fair value limited by historical cost, 
thereby requiring a past transaction that does not indeed exist for OSS.
It is self-evident that the traditional view of assets has become unable to deal 
with shared resource systems. OSS is clearly an asset, so far as one can see it 
embodies future economic benefits to any entities employing it in their regular 
business or activities. Regrettably, accounting standards are based on a traditional 
private-goods-centric view of assets, which sets exclusive control as a mean to 
profit through competitive advantage. How this biased viewpoint spreads through 
whole standards-setting processes is shown by two meaningful and generally 
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accepted by default accounting principles: (1) assets definition is identical even for 
not-for-profit entities, which are not headed for surplus through competitiveness 
but for common good; and (2) no future economic benefit can simultaneously 
be an asset of more than one entity, so an asset would be expected to appear in 
only one set of single entity financial statements. Those scholars interested in a 
comprehensive research about shared resource systems and financial reporting 
may have a large field of research available in order to enlighten the relationship.
Regardless of how the above could be suitably solved, there would still exist a 
strong technical deterrent: a value is needed to recognise an asset in a balance sheet. 
Once historical cost valuation is simply discarded due to the absence of a previous 
transaction, the fair value approach requires accurate valuation techniques since 
market-based values are not available. But there is not a suitable procedure so that 
OSS full potential value could be accurately measured. Although some techniques 
based on measures such as programming effort or savings have been developed 
in recent years, they are only partial measures not capturing the wide scope of 
OSS as a shared resource system. Again, scholars may be challenged by thorough 
research on techniques from which realistic and objective valuation, useful for 
financial reporting, could arise. 
Until both referred problems are solved, commons-based peer production won’t 
fit in the financial accounting framework. Thus, what may be an organizations’ 
most valuable asset is removed from financial statements, and a whole ecosystem 
of commons-based innovation might be left aside from the entities’ valuation and 
performance.
2.2. Sustainability and self-governance
The term ‘tragedy of the commons’ was coined to describe the economic processes 
that destroy natural common resources by over-exploitation. These processes first 
described by Hardin (1968) apply whenever a good is rivalrous (consumption of 
the good by one individual will reduce availability of the good for consumption 
by others) but non-excludable (no one can be effectively excluded from using 
the good). This type of resource is frequently called ‘common pool resource’ 
(CPR) and creates the ‘free rider’ problem, when someone consumes a resource 
paying less than the full cost. Free riding can lead to the non-production or under-
production, or to the excessive use of a CPR. The classical economic view offers 
two ways to deal with this matter: privatizing the CPR to an owner with a direct 
interest who can govern its use, or imposing regulation from outside the system; 
neither of which has been necessary on OSS.
Commons-based peer production concept is a necessary background to 
fully understand the whole set of complex incentives and motivations driving 
current business models in OSS and their associated sustainability alternatives. It 
describes a new model of socio-economic production in which the creative energy 
of large numbers of people is coordinated by means of the Internet into large, 
meaningful projects mostly without traditional hierarchical organization and 
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often, but not always, conceived without financial compensation for contributors 
(Benkler 2002, 2006). According to Tapscott and Williams (2006) individuals 
participation in peer-production would be explained by a wide range of intrinsic 
and self-interested reasons, basically because they feel passionate about their 
particular area of expertise and enjoy creating something new or better.
Software is not a classical CPR because is not rivalrous; there is no cost to the 
actual users or developers if an extra user gain access to it. But an open source 
project is clearly a CPR; it succeeds or fails according to contributions from its 
members. Software can’t be destroyed by overconsumption, however present 
and potential contributors are the real scarce resource in an open source project, 
which could drive to overproduction or underproduction of code. Von Hippel and 
Von Krogh (2003) consider OSS development to be a ‘private-collective’ model 
of innovation: privately funded with collective benefit. Developers contribute to 
OSS because they collect private benefits not available to free riders. Several 
authors have addressed these private benefits: own satisfaction (Raymond 1999), 
career improvement through higher reputation (Lerner and Tirole 2002) -although 
this benefit have been disputed by Bitzer et al. (2010)- or mixed internal and 
external motivations like fun, altruism, reciprocity, career prospects, or self-
development (Hars and Ou 2002; Lakhani and Wolf 2003; Roberts et al. 2006; 
Oreg and Nov 2008). While this research explains why developers contribute to 
the production of OSS it is not clear how communities lead these efforts to reach 
the final objectives in an individual project.
In this line of thought, O’Mahony (2003) argues that OSS share some features 
of CPR problem in that the regulation of behaviour in a manner that maximizes 
collective gains is of concern; OSS would be non rivalrous, but vulnerable to 
use that could threaten its availability to all through proprietary appropriation. 
Hence, communities would develop mechanisms to govern themselves and 
manage their work, especially when it is distributed in commercial markets or 
becomes the basis for standards. In general terms, self-governance is the result of 
collective action combining knowledge and will on the one hand, and supporting 
and consistent institutional arrangements on the other hand (Wagner 2005). 
When applied to OSS, self-governance arises from the gathering of programming 
skills of developers, and the will of a community powered by ethical or business 
reasons; this collective action is supported by a legal framework embodied in 
software licenses and community codes of conduct, and by technical artifacts 
allowing collaborative software development over the Internet.
It has been a decade since Weber (2004) stated: ‘The open source process 
is an ongoing experiment. It is testing an imperfect mix of leadership, informal 
coordination mechanisms, implicit and explicit norms, along with some formal 
governance structures that are evolving and doing so at a rate that has been 
sufficient to hold surprisingly complex systems together’. Still we don’t have 
enough evidences about the self-governance structures, although Schweik and 
English (2007) found that they were mostly informal and quite flat because they 
were viewed as a barrier to free creativity and innovation. Nevertheless, ideal 
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mechanisms should be similar to those included in the theoretical framework 
built by Ostrom (1990) studying CPRs that follow an alternative path to avoid 
destruction by means of agreement and self-generated governance. If we assume 
that OSS is a type of CPR produced by means of common-based peer production, 
we should focus on the creation of new code and its relationship with the free 
rider issue. It pays back for a contributor to wait for new software or feature to be 
developed for someone else, rather than worth the cost of developing themselves, 
or to create a competitive advantage by not contributing modified or new created 
code back to the community.
Some attributes of CPRs and appropriators are frequently associated to an 
increased likelihood of self-governance arising from consensus (Ostrom 1992). 
Some of them could be also applied to OSS and contributors:
•	 Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of contributions 
should be frequently available at a relatively low cost.
•	 Predictability: The flow of contributions should be relatively predictable.
•	 Salience: Contributors should be dependent on the CPR for a major 
portion of their livelihood.
•	 Common understanding: Contributors should have a shared image of how 
the resource system operates and how their actions affect each other and 
the resource system.
•	 Trust and Reciprocity: Contributors trust one another to keep promises 
and relate to one another with reciprocity.
•	 Autonomy: Contributors are able to determine access and harvesting rules 
without external authorities countermanding them.
•	 Prior organizational experience and local leadership: Contributors should 
have learned at least minimal skills of organization and leadership through 
participation in other local associations or learning about ways that 
neighbouring groups have organized.
Furthermore, an adequate communication may affect the level of cooperation 
and enhance the relationship within the community of CPRs users (Poteete 
et al. 2010). As regards OSS contributors, there is not reason to think it would be 
different.
Whatever reporting framework to be adopted on OSS, it must conform to these 
attributes. Certainly, OSS is a high valuable asset for organizations, although it 
cannot be reported and valued on financial statements due to shortcomings set 
forth in Section 2.1. Hence, a lack of institutional recognition for OSS as a shared 
resource might arise.
2.3. Social responsibility and sustainability reporting
The discussion around open source and free software terms outstandingly 
resembles the debate around the social role of business, which has been dominated 
by the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The ‘open source’ term 
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was coined as merely an instrumental definition to deal with the dual meaning 
of the term free at ‘free software’ in the business realm.5 Both terms describe the 
same set of software but they stand for views based on fundamentally different 
values: while open source is a practical development methodology focused on 
how to make software better, free software is an ethical imperative that pays 
attention to software users’ essential freedoms (Stallman 2001). 
Business developing OSS project their shadow on the social scene in a similar 
way to not-for-profit organizations. This clearly remind us the moral management 
model developed by Carroll (1991), wherein business is expected not only to do 
well at economic and financial levels but to do good at social level: first, doing 
what is right and fair (ethical level), and then contributing financial and human 
resources to the community and improving quality of life (philanthropic level). 
It also drives the discussion on reporting OSS assets to sustainability or social 
responsibility reporting.
Both concepts –open source and free software- and their set of values could 
be integrated in different levels of classical Carroll’s CSR pyramid as seen on 
Figure 2, thus closing the gap between their philosophies. Open source values 
are the basic building block, a development methodology with a high level of 
operating efficiency. Free software values and their engagement to sharing and 
cooperation are the uppermost piece of the pyramid, a shared resource which 
everyone can use and improve. In the middle of the pyramid, legal responsibilities 
embody the particular obligations determined by open source license terms and 
other legal commitments, while ethic responsibilities comprise those activities 
and practices. OSS projects are not only expected to obey the law as society’s 
codification of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, they are also expected 
to obey the set of particular rules that are endorsed in their own legal artifacts 
(i.e. licenses, trademark policies, copyright assignment and corporate existence). 
Projects adopt the language of the law to organize their operations, adding a legal 
layer to the structural sovereignty of these projects (Coleman 2012). Ethics values 
of OSS become the driving force of the legal artifacts produced by communities, 
thus they might reflect higher behaviour standards than that currently required by 
legal framework. Their roots are grounded in the values and philosophy that are 
standard in the hacker community. Hacker ethics were first described by Levy 
(1984): sharing, openness, decentralization and improvement to quality of life 
were core to hackers and free software developers. According to Coleman and Hill 
(2005) they are reinforced in the communities through the sustained collaborative 
development of code, and discussions and decisions about licenses and project 
policy. Open source focus on business performance by stressing practical benefits 
has often been interpreted as a denial of the ethics of software freedom. However, 
these ethical foundations were not eliminated by the corporate acceptance of OSS, 
5
 ‘Free software’ is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you should think of ‘free’ 
as in ‘free speech’, not as in ‘free beer’ (Stallman 2001). 
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moreover its success in the commercial sphere has the effect of rendering visible 
these underlying ethics to a broader audience (Coleman 2012).
Once the relationship between OSS and social responsibility becomes 
apparent, benefits other than mere reporting should be analysed. Several studies 
show that mandatory disclosure of sustainability information leads to an increase 
in the social responsibility of business leaders and to a prioritization of sustainable 
development while establishing social legitimacy (Godfrey 2005; Margolis et al. 
2007; Ioannou and Serafeim 2011). As seen by Porter and Kramer (2011) these 
findings suggest that sustainability reporting can change organizational behaviour 
and provide higher economic value through competitive advantage. Therefore, 
voluntary sustainability reporting may enhance the economic value produced by 
an open source project.
A sustainability or social responsibility report is an organizational statement 
that discloses information about economic, environmental, social and governance 
performance. Since organizational capacity to prevail is based on performance 
in these four key areas, a growing number of organizations are using this sort 
of non-financial reporting not just as an accountability tool but to drive strategy, 
unlocking new sources of revenue and growth (Lungu et al. 2011).
On the open source model of operation and decision-making sustainability 
reporting might also serve as a tool for engaging with stakeholders. A stakeholder 
is any individual or entity that may affect or be affected by organizational practices 
or processes. Within the OSS domain several major groups of stakeholders could 
be identified (see section 4 for a specific OSS list); their different agendas, 
Figure 2: CSR pyramid and OSS.
Source: own elaboration.
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approaches and priorities are intrinsic features of a collaborative and open 
methodology. Stakeholder management seeks to integrate groups into managerial 
decision-making by establishing a dialogue that helps to address the question of 
responsiveness to the generally unclear signals received from the environment 
(Garriga and Melé 2004). Hence, sustainability reporting may gather the 
multiplicity of legitimate interest of all stakeholders in order to secure useful input 
to organizational and self-governance processes, enabling a strong assessment 
of the shared resources performance and becoming key to support continuous 
improvement over time in the open source community.
In broad outline, scholar research has attempted to link management practices 
to financial performance. Margolis et al. (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 
192 effects revealed in 167 studies during 35 years. They found an overall small 
positive effect of social responsibility over financial performance. On the one 
hand, the association was stronger for charitable contributions, revealed misdeeds 
and environmental performance and when social responsibility was assessed more 
broadly through observer perceptions and self-reported social performance. On 
the other hand, association was weakest for corporate policies and transparency 
and when social responsibility was assessed through third-party audits and mutual 
fund screens. Nevertheless, no financial penalty for sustainability reporting was 
found.
Although it is clear that social responsibility generates some kind of financial 
return, it is not so clear the mechanism through firms obtain the return. Two 
different views have tried to explain this mechanism. Jones (1995), Preston and 
O’Bannon (1997), Waddock and Graves (1997), Margolis and Walsh (2003) and 
several other studies have shown that both views could be at work. Based on 
Cheng et al. (2014) these are the most frequently found mechanisms:
•	 One view thinks about social responsibility as a distinctive resource 
that generates benefits or reduces costs. Social responsibility could 
be generating significant managerial benefits that would translate into 
financial benefits (Brammer and Millington 2008); it could provide better 
access to valuable resources (Graves and Waddock 1994), attracting and 
retaining higher quality employees (Turban and Greening 1997; Greening 
and Turban 2000), allowing for better marketing of products and services 
(Moskowitz 1972; Fombrun 1996), creating unforeseen opportunities 
(Fombrun et al. 2000), and contributing towards gaining social legitimacy 
(Hawn et al. 2011). On this view, social responsibility could be viewed 
as a kind of advertising operating in similar ways: increasing demand 
for products and services and/or reducing consumer price sensitivity 
(Dorfman and Steiner 1954; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Navarro 1988; 
Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), developing intangible assets related to 
goodwill (Graves and Waddock 1994; Gardberg and Fombrun 2006; Hull 
and Rothenberg 2008) or even enhancing corporate reputation (Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990; Fombrun 2005; Freeman et al. 2007).
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•	 Another view conceives social responsibility as a perception; the 
appearance of doing good, rather than its substantive impact, generates 
financial returns. This means that social responsibility could help mitigate 
the likelihood of negative regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Freeman 
1984; Berman et al. 1999; Hillman and Keim 2001), attract socially 
aware consumers (Hillman and Keim 2001), or attract financial resources 
from socially responsible investors (Kapstein 2001). Furthermore, social 
responsibility would be connected to better stakeholder commitment, 
limiting the likelihood of short-term opportunistic behaviour in the 
organization (Benabou and Tirole 2010; Eccles et al. 2011) and signalling 
long-term focus on their activities (Spence 1973; Benabou and Tirole 
2010).
Institutional reporting to members of the community and society is a key objective 
in order to create institutions to governing the commons and to take advantage of 
socially responsible activity. In the next section, we examine stakeholders and 
indicators in order to evaluate sustainability in open source developments, because 
we believe non-financial reporting is clearly suitable to empower attributes that 
encourage self-governing forms.
3. Methodology
We have used Delphi methodology in order to extract and summarize the 
knowledge from a group of experts. Delphi is developed to reach a consensus 
from an expert panel for researching complex issues where knowledge is limited. 
It does not offer the rigour of statistical testing or quantitative analysis, but it 
provides a scientific methodology that is well suited to issues that require the 
insights of subject matter experts, because it allows the respondents to revaluate 
their answers (Grisham 2009). Delphi involves expert panel, repeated rounds, 
opportunity for respondents to rethink their answers and anonymity of the experts. 
The experts answer questionnaires in two or more rounds; when a round has been 
finished an anonymous summary is fed back to participants in order to encourage 
them to revise earlier answers in the common belief that the range of answers 
will decrease and converge towards a consensus. Experts do not interact with 
each other, therefore situations where the group is dominated by the prevailing 
views of outstanding participants can be avoided. Measures of central location 
and dispersion of the final rounds determine the degree of consensus.
What is an expert does not have a clear and undisputed meaning in academic 
literature. However, there should be clear that an expert is an individual possessing 
great knowledge from personal proven experience over the field of study (Linstone 
1999; Goodman 2006). Expertise is paramount to Delphi method, not being a 
statistical technique it does not depend on selecting a representative sample but on 
a set of individuals with a deep knowledge in the issue under research (Okoli and 
Pawlowski 2004). Accordingly, the criteria for selection of the experts become 
qualitative-critical (based on their knowledge) but not quantitative-critical (total 
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number of experts). Literature suggests a range of experts from ten to thirty for 
each group formed around an issue, performing better in heterogeneous groups 
but tending towards the upper range in homogeneous groups, depending on the 
professional and social diversity of their members (Okoli and Pawlowski 2004; 
Peffers and Tuunanen 2005; Gallego Pereira et al. 2008).
A target of at least ten experts was set in order to maximize success in our 
research. We were aware that this figure placed the study in the lower bound of 
the range considered in academic literature. However, professional heterogeneity 
was controlled to counterbalance this handicap. 
Delphi questionnaires were sent to twenty-six Spanish open source experts, 
who were selected by their involvement in OSS projects and communities. 
According to a survey led by the UNU-Merit in 2002, Spain had the third largest 
community of OSS developers (6.7% of total worldwide developers);6 in 2009, 
Global Open Source Software Potential Index listed Spain as one of the top-ten 
countries with the highest level of open source activity;7 Spanish National Open 
Source Software Observatory declared in 2010 that Spain was among the most 
active countries in the EU in terms of OSS adoption.8 
Participants were classified into three categories based upon professional 
affiliation: practitioners, civil servants and faculty members. Response rate was 
fourteen questionnaires in the first round and twelve questionnaires in the second 
and third rounds. The expert panel was composed of nine practitioners (six were 
affiliated to private companies and three associated to not-for-profit entities), 
three civil servants from technological institutes and two faculty members; all of 
them belonging to different institutions and regions. The open federal nature of 
Spain and large cultural variations between its various parts make this sample of 
experts broader than it may appear. The study was conducted between January 
and July 2012.
In a first step most important organizational stakeholders were identified. 
Stakeholders are individuals and organizations that are actively involved in the 
project, or whose interest may be positively or negatively affected as a result of 
project execution or project completion. Initial identification was based on usual 
stakeholders in any kind of organization. In order to better focus their identification 
and influencing factors, they were confirmed by review of most notably previous 
research works and business strategy reports (Krishnamurthy 2005; Riehle 2007, 
2011; Aslett 2008, 2010).
In the first round, the experts were asked to rank the pertinence of each 
stakeholder on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 
6 OSS Survey and Study. International Institute of Infonomics, UNU-Merit. Available: http://
flossproject.org/report/FLOSSFinal_2b.pdf.
7 Red Hat & Georgia Tech Open Source Software Potential Index (OSPI) Project. Available: http://
investors.redhat.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=378470.
8 CENATIC. Report on the International Status of Open Source Software 2010. Available: http://
www.cenatic.es/publicaciones/onsfa.
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‘Strongly Agree’. They were allowed to propose any other stakeholder or remark 
about them that they considered properly. Members were also pledged to suggest 
any relevant indicators for each stakeholder in the questionnaire.
In the second round, we added new indicators to the panel proposed ones, largely 
based on institutional characteristics of stable local CPR management identified 
by Ostrom (1990, 2005) and on our previous work (García-García and Alonso de 
Magdaleno 2012). Indicators were arranged into several classes intending to reflect 
a set of core measurable aspects for any open source development: organizational 
profile, community profile, activity in the community, persistence of collaboration, 
support and role of community and community success (see Results section for 
a full list). For each class, experts were asked to rank the importance of each 
indicator on an ordinal scale from the most to the least important. They were as 
well requested for validation of the remarks contained in first round. A third round 
was later conducted in order to feedback second round results.
The main  data collection tools were questionnaires designed by the 
researchers in each of the three rounds. Each one had been previously tested with 
a reduced set of experts that didn’t take part in Delphi panel. Questionnaires were 
submitted by email as forms with closed and open-ended questions to be answered 
at locked fields in Open Document Text files (*.odt). Given their vast expertise 
and experience in open source software domain we supposed that it wouldn’t 
constitute a response barrier while offering more flexibility in the questionnaire 
design over web survey tools.
Building consensus is an essential component of any Delphi process and is 
usually estimated through measures of central tendency and dispersion. Although 
arithmetic mean -the average of a set of values- is commonly considered the 
descriptor that best summarizes a statistical distribution, the median -middle 
value of a sorted set- rather than the mean is preferred as representative of the 
group’s responses in Delphi, since single extreme answers could pull the mean 
unrealistically. Even though when dealing with Likert scales the median is 
constrained to the actual categories in the data and can only fall in one of these 
categories, hence smaller changes in the distribution of values are not faithfully 
displayed. Interpolated median (IM) provides a way to adjust the median to avoid 
influence of great scale granularity of response categories. 
We use the following formula in order to calculate the IM, according to Young 
and Veldman (1972) and Kiess and Green (2009):

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=
+ =
N
CF
L W FIM
W
L F
-
2
 if 0
F
 if 0
2
where L is the lower limit of the interval containing the median, W is the width 
of the interval containing the median, N is the total number of frequency, CF is 
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the cumulative frequency corresponding to the lower limit of the interval that 
contains the median and F is the frequency in the interval containing the median.
Frequency distribution, first and third quartiles of previous round answers 
were provided to the experts in order to compare and think over initial reply. Any 
qualitative remarks or proposals were also anonymously conveyed to contribute 
to clarify their responses.
4. Results
A. Stakeholders
Initial stakeholders proposed by researchers had great acceptance among experts. 
Table 1 contains the results of the Delphi process related to Likert evaluation. 
Interpolated median (IM), standard deviation (SD), first quartile (Q1) and third 
quartile (Q3) are shown for each stakeholder.
All but two proposed amendments to the initial listing of stakeholders 
were rejected in the second round of evaluation. The first modification to the 
Table 1: Final stakeholders.
 Code  Description  IM  SD  Q1  Q3
Inside stakeholders
 IS1(*) Firm owners and 
shareholders/Project members 4.50  0.65  4  5
 IS2(*) Management, leadership or governing bodies  4.72  0.85  4  5
 IS3  Employees  4.80  1.02  4.25  5
Outside stakeholders financing 
or taking active part in 
development efforts
 OSA1  
Economic actors including 
development to hardware or 
software products
 4.72  1.27  4  5
 OSA2  Independent contributors  4.62  0.51  4  5
 OSA3  
Allies in technological 
development & universities 
and research groups
 4.62  0.93  4  5
 OSA4  Institutions backing or financing development  4.80  0.94  4.25  5
 OSA5  Financial donors  4.17  1.29  3  5
Outside stakeholders unrelated to 
financing or development efforts  OSB1  Customers & software users  4.62  0.84  4  5
 OSB2  Other OSS communities  4.72  0.50  4  5
 OSB3  Competition (OSS or privative software)  4.62  1.27  3.25  5
 OSB4  Governments  4.62  0.99  4  5
 OSB5  Civil society9  4.50  1.27  4  5
(*) Combined as a single stakeholder in micro and small-sized companies.
Source: own elaboration.
9
 Institutions, organizations and individuals in the society which are independent of the government 
and are not included in the previous stakeholders.
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initial listing was to put universities and research groups together with allies in 
technological development [OSA3 group]. Second amendment was related only 
to micro and small-sized enterprises;10 firm owners and shareholders [IS1], and 
management leadership or government bodies [IS2] should be joined together 
because the same individuals would play their roles.
The greatest disagreement, in accordance with the larger values of SD, was 
related to the relevance of economic actors including development to hardware 
or software products [OSA1], financial donors [OSA5], competition (OS or 
privative) [OSB3] and civil society [OSB5].
Relative to OSA1, experts agreed this is a very heterogeneous group where 
many of the actors simply collect the code and assimilate it to their products. 
Usually, small-scale developers or hardware assemblers without technical of 
financial capacity to make code contributions, they behave as ‘free-riders’ taking 
advantage of OSS licenses. Some experts suggested they should be merged with 
customers and software users [OSB1]. Nevertheless, the suggestion did not reach 
consensus on the second round due to the potential offered to be contributors in 
the near future.
The cause of disagreement was very similar to the group civil society 
[OSB5]. Although the full society benefits if software is developed as a digital 
common, civil society is a heterogeneous group, with scattered interests and poor 
organization. Consequently it is not easily defined as a stakeholder to an OSS 
development. A few experts felt civil society representation should be attributed 
to governments as guarantors of the general interest or common good. Hence, 
stakeholders OSB4 and OSB5 should be merged. However, majority decision was 
to keep then separated in order to distinguish wealth creation for society from 
government role as a major decision-maker.
Groups competition (OS or private) [OSB3] and financial donors [OSA5] 
were the groups with larger disagreement; indeed, the latter were also the 
group with the lowest IM valuation. However, both were clearly recognized as 
stakeholders; no member of the panel asked for their deletion. Competitors have 
a dual behaviour. On the one hand, they monitor the development of competing 
products by comparing software features and communities. On the other hand, 
they could be seeking collaboration. OSS philosophy allows for competitors to 
play a collaborative role joining forces in order to obtain a commoditized code 
of software that could provide a basis for own future developments. Privative 
software firms are usually involved in this collaboration when the license imposes 
minimal restrictions on the redistribution of covered software (permissive 
licenses); companies in this case should be included as components of the OSA 
group (outside stakeholders financing or taking active part in development efforts).
10
 According to EU firm-size definition: Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises [Official Journal L 124 of 
20.05.2003].
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Despite not being considered irrelevant, the lowest rating of group financial 
donors [OSA5] was explained by experts as the result of two main reasons:
•	 Financial donors are mainly focused on getting a freely available software 
product. They are not drawn into development stages, their role being 
similar to those contributing to crowdfunding projects.
•	 Financial statements of not-for-profit or business in charge of project 
management should be enough to meet funders’ information needs, 
focused on ensuring OS project is properly funded.
Whether it is based on not-for-profit or on a firm, OSS development is dependant 
on financial funding  almost as much as it depends on code contributions. Major 
OSS projects often hire coders to supplement voluntary contributions. Keeping 
their community alive and active also requires monetary funding. Thus, we firmly 
believe that the role of financial donors in OSS is worthy of further investigation 
in both not-for-profit and business entities. Clearly, their role is more significant in 
the former than in the latter since business entities mainly use equity investment 
to finance their activity.
Greatest agreement, according to the lower values of the SD, was reached for 
firm owners and shareholders or project members [IS1], independent contributors 
[OSA2] and other OSS communities [OSB2]. It is not surprising the data is 
showing the fundamental social interaction between insiders and outsiders that 
outlines the commons-based peer production processes. CPR nature of OSS is 
also present in these three stakeholders, but only at contribution level. This result 
is consistent with our landscape, which assumes an open source project is a CPR 
that succeeds or fails according to contributions from its community.
The panel of experts also agreed that stakeholders groups and relevance could 
be slightly modified depending on the following attributes of the OSS project:
•	 Aimed at addressing the needs of a specific industry or market (vertical 
market software) or the needs of a wide range of industries or markets 
(horizontal market software).
•	 Mainly developed for internal use or for wide external circulation.
•	 Main actors features: transnational corporation, micro or SME firm, and 
not-for-profit entity.
•	 Software license: permissive license (BSD type) or restrictive license 
(GPL type).
B. Sustainability indicators
Communication requirements of each stakeholder group, based on their interest 
and influence, should help implement the sustainability reporting strategy of an 
open organization. In order to put it into practice, key performance indicators 
with corresponding parameters, objectives and measures will have to be defined 
on future stages of our research. Experts in the first round were asked to generate 
indicators for each proposed stakeholder. In the second round, these indicators 
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were aggregated to further indicators proposed by researchers and based on 
previous studies. Then, experts were asked to rank the importance of indicators 
from the most to the least important. Full list of categories and indicators is on 
Table 2, where the indicators are arranged by descending order of preference in 
each category.
In order to facilitate a deeper understanding and interpretation, groups of 
indicators are depicted through box-and-whisker plots on Figure 3. For each one 
indicator first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles are represented by the bottom and 
the top of the box, and the second quartile (Q2; median value) is represented by 
the band inside. The ends of whiskers at each box represent the lower and higher 
values still within 1.5 interquartile range (Q3-Q1). Any data not included between 
the whiskers is plotted as an outlier with a small circle. At each group indicators 
are shown from top to bottom in order of decreasing relevance for the experts.
In accordance with the median values and the interquartile range, greatest 
consensus on the major importance was reached for indicator ‘How community is 
involved in product design, production, delivery or service’ from category ‘Support 
and role of community’. Then, ‘Frequency of contact with the community’ from 
category ‘Persistence of collaboration’, together with ‘Generation of professional 
networks to ensure continuity and future support’ and ‘How often community 
collaborates on development’ from category ‘Community success’ ranked second. 
Importance on median values but with a wider interquartile range than previous 
indicators was also showed by ‘Sources of funding, main donors and monetary 
value of donations’ and ‘Project roadmap’ from categories ‘Organizational profile’ 
and ‘Community profile’, respectively.
In view of the results these indicators could be considered sufficiently 
representative of their category information needs. This result is also consistent 
with the values and economic operations of OSS: and activity fully-dependent 
of a wide community of developers and users and a freely available knowledge 
that allows local business to be created and empowered, expanding information 
technologies industry beyond large oligopolistic corporations. The set of indicators 
displays a great concern about operative and strategic goals of development, even 
about financial issues although donors hadn’t scored well in previous stakeholder 
analysis. We do not feel confident to speculate on this latter result, apart from 
noting that it is probably related to going-concern assessments about the financial 
capacity to carry out project activities more than related to transparency issues. 
Again, further research is needed on the relationship between OSS and financial 
issues to support this guess.
A clear consensus in priority was not reached for the rest of categories. Thus, 
we must assume that all indicators are valid enough for information needs on each 
category. However, we did find consensus on the allocation of some indicators 
to the lower places. Consequently, they could be labelled as limited relevance 
indicators and not be taken into account.
‘Potential to obtain a paid employment related to the project’, ‘Information 
about community members (including corporate members)’ and ‘Information about 
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Table 2: Indicators in descending order of preference.
Organizational profile (7 indicators)
A Sources of funding, main donors and monetary value of donations.
B Alliances and partnerships.
C Autonomy of employees to work in new projects related to community or organization.
D Incomes to support activity (excluded incomes from sales and services).
E Participatory management: training and collaboration in external events.
F Prizes, awards, certifications and quality labels.
G Information and status about non-profit entity / Information about ownership of the firm.
Community profile (8 indicators)
A Project roadmap.
B Community and governing body relationship.
C Information about project license rights and duties.
D Project values and code of conduct.
E Potential to improve loyalty, generate new collaborations or memberships from other communities.
F Potential to obtain a paid employment related to project.
G Information about community members (including corporate members).
H Information about how community members differ from other communities (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats analysis).
Activity in the community (7 indicators)
A Developers and users contributions.
B Creation of documentation.
C Number of members, supporters and volunteers (total and relative figures, distribution, growth ...).
D Time between releases.
E Number of external modules developed.
F Time for solving bugs or developing new features.
G Number of versions released.
Persistence of collaboration (5 indicators)
A Frequency of contact with the community.
B How often community collaborates in development.
C How and when members become loyal.
D Types of collaboration from community.
E Conversion from external collaborator to paid employee.
Support and role of community (7 indicators)
A How community is involved in product design, production, delivery or service.
B Improvement programs offered to the community: training, knowledge or skills.
C Technological independence allowed to users.
D Programs in place to communicate and ensure community satisfaction
E Processes to consider and coordinate activities with other industry actors. 
F Participation in digital literacy campaigns.
G Processes to generate and communicate promotional and self-spreading campaigns.
Community success (9 indicators)
A Generation of professional networks to ensure continuity and future support.
B Sale and services rates and download rates; comparison with similar product (free or privatives).
C Estimation about project code reused in other developments.
D Information about derivative works and reuse in third party developments.
E Measurements of customers and users satisfaction; conversion rate from users to customers.
F Economic impact on regional or local business.
G Reporting about quality management of code and documentation.
H Efficiency and effectiveness reporting.
I Improvement of software used as infrastructure for the project.
Source: own elaboration.
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how community members differ from other communities (strengths, weakness, 
opportunities and threats analysis)’ are clearly assigned to lower positions on 
community profile ranking. Both ‘Numbers of versions released’ and ‘Conversion 
from external collaborator to paid employee’ are the last of the ‘activity in the 
community’ and ‘persistence of collaboration’ lists, respectively. ‘Participation 
in digital literacy campaigns’ and ‘Processes to generate and communicate 
promotional and self-spreading campaigns’ are latest on ‘support and role of 
community’ category. The apparent relegation of this seven indicators shows a set 
of guidelines to avoid when making a report on OSS sustainability: potential for 
gainful employment, identity and differentiating features of community members, 
release history, use in digital literacy campaigns and advocacy and dissemination 
campaigns are remarkably little valued according to their potential to meet 
information needs of stakeholders.
The manifest relegation of indicators is remarkable related to gainful 
employment because it is contrary to the signalling hypothesis developed by 
Lerner and Tirole (2002). According to this hypothesis individual contributors may 
use OSS as an opportunity to signal their talents to peers, prospective employers 
and the venture capital community. In this way, contributors would be expecting 
direct benefits for themselves when sharing code to an OSS project. Signalling 
hypothesis has been accepted for years as the main explanation for individuals’ 
contributions in view of its coherence with economic theory. Nevertheless, it 
has been recently challenged by Bitzer et al. (2010) and Lee and Kim (2013) 
who didn’t find support for it in empirical analysis. Their alternative hypotheses 
are based on ethical and social motivations to build an open and freely available 
digital commons, regardless of present or future compensations. Our finding is 
coherent with this new vision that makes contributors less utilitarian and more 
socially responsible. Nonetheless, whatever motivates contributors to donate 
software code free of charge, it just deserves a more comprehensive research 
whose results will be of great concern to any type of OSS social reporting.
The low relevance given to digital literacy and OSS promotion campaigns is 
also inconsistent with the commonly accepted values of OSS. Experts’ comments 
allow us to explain this fact by appealing to the proper function of the software 
development role. Digital literacy and OSS promotion campaigns would be 
functions attributed to user groups, NGOs, educational authorities or governments 
but not to software development entities.
Except as aforesaid as low scored indicators, the remainder ones should be 
taken into account to report OSS social responsibility and sustainability.
5. Conclusions
This article advocates OSS for digital commons and focus on the issue of 
sustainability. Knowledge commons are not traditional physical commons, 
humans must intervene to create them. There is a wide and rich literature studying 
commons in environmental resources but they face a fundamental difference 
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with digital commons. The former are an existing scarce resource that could 
be destroyed by over-exploitation. The latter are created and improved through 
contributions from a community, but they are virtual assets that cannot be over-
harvested. Institutional design is essential to overcome the destruction of natural 
commons through self-governance processes that manage collective action. 
We can assume that it would be also paramount when dealing with knowledge 
commons.
OSS creation and improvement are totally dependent of the flow of code 
contributions but essential to this is the institutional recognition required in order 
to extend corporate contributions. Although financial valuation is not allowed 
under current accounting framework, it becomes plausible to report contributions 
and project performance within the framework of social responsibility. This 
type of reporting might be able to increase the institutional recognition of OSS 
development activities, furthermore it might strengthen the capacities to execute 
collective action and self-governance processes.
Our work tries to close the gap between the informational needs of self-
governance structures in a collective action environment and the current 
framework for corporate and financial reporting by formally specifying the role 
of OSS as a CPR and the code contributions as a socially responsible activity. To 
this end, we performed a search for stakeholders interested in OSS developments, 
and a core set of indicators for sustainability and social responsibility reporting. 
Study was based on Delphi methodology.
Stakeholders were divided into groups according to their relationship to the 
OSS project. Outsiders were subdivided into those financing or taking active part in 
development, and those unrelated to financing or development efforts. Indicators 
were grouped into six categories according to their qualities. A broad consensus 
among experts was reached on stakeholders, especially on those related with the 
production process. However, economic actors including the OSS development 
to their hardware or software products, competitors, financial donors and society 
didn’t reach the same levels of agreement as others did.
Evaluation of indicators showed that those reflecting an economic model 
based on openness and collaboration with great concern about operative and 
strategic goals offered the best results. Regarding the rest of indicators, all of 
them deliver satisfactory results in order to be included in sustainability reports; 
with the exception of indicators linked with gainful employment, digital literacy 
and OSS advocacy.
It is highly probable that entities developing OSS -either not-for-profit 
organizations or business corporations- may not know or use the term ‘social 
responsibility’, but the creation of a body of common knowledge freely available 
to society means they have a responsible engagement to their economic activities. 
Economic actors involved in development are certainly carrying out a social 
responsible activity. When standing code contributions are made by business, their 
inclusion on sustainability reporting might be paramount to support future code 
flows and fair valuation. A suitable reporting framework might bring institutional 
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recognition to OSS so that a positive attitude towards code release and social 
support to OSS may be created.
This paper opens new horizons in reporting OSS relevance and managing 
collaborative communities developing and improving a CPR. It offers 
fundamentals of starting and building a simple social responsibility report. We are 
aware that most open source projects and communities might be reluctant to spend 
resources collecting data and publishing reports without seeing tangible results. 
However, a long-term benefit may arise from drawing attention of stakeholders 
to the realities of collective action, self-governance issues and sustainability of 
the OSS project. As for this matter, experts from the business field pointed out 
in their commentaries the similarities between the indicators and the information 
collected in order to address quality measures. Hence, if sustainability reporting 
were aligned with quality standards for software life cycle processes (ISO/IEC 
12207), process improvement and capability determination (ISO/IEC 15504), 
external services management (ISO/IEC 20000-1), IT code of good practices 
(ISO/IEC 20000-2) or even with general quality standards (ISO 9001), synergies 
would be generated since there is some kind of parallelism between our proposed 
indicators and general quality management performance indicators. Business and 
not-for-profit organizations concerned with a compelling sustainability reporting 
could also enhance their quality management systems; or vice versa, those entities 
engaged with quality management systems could be facing an opportunity to start 
with OSS sustainability reporting and enjoy its benefits.
Therefore, we firmly believe that an appropriate sustainability reporting 
framework for OSS development activities is an area to explore which would open 
up new lines of project management and institutional recognition; aiming straight 
both for industry benefits and common good through a better CPR self-governance.
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